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ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MITIGATION THROUGH 
PROCEDURAL REVIEW: THE NEPA JURISPRUDENCE 
OF JUDGE BETTY B. FLETCHER, A TRUSTEE OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND WOMAN OF SUBSTANCE 
Kenneth S. Weiner* 
Abstract: In the past thirty years, as judges who first required compliance with the 
mandates of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 retired or died, the First and 
Ninth Circuits became the most stalwart keepers of NEPA’s flame. This article explores how, 
despite the procedural characterization of NEPA, Judge Betty B. Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit 
has been able to focus attention on NEPA’s substantive goal of achieving productive 
harmony between people and nature, while respecting the limits of judicial review of 
executive action. Judge Fletcher insists public officials answer a simple question: If you are 
not well-informed about whether environmental harm will occur, how can you have given the 
proposal a “hard look”? Judge Fletcher holds United States government officials accountable 
when making decisions affecting people and nature—accountable to prepare and fully 
disclose the required studies, so the democratic process of civic and civil debate can occur; 
accountable to search for better alternatives; and perhaps most important, accountable to any 
promises they make that their actions will not harm environmental quality for present and 
future generations. This is the jurisprudence Judge Fletcher has bequeathed to the United 
States, and to those around the world who look to the United States and NEPA for leadership 
on environmental stewardship. 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19691 (NEPA) has often 
been called our nation’s environmental Magna Carta. NEPA’s structure 
                                                     
* Senior Partner, Environmental, Land & Natural Resources, K&L Gates LLP (Seattle office). Mr. 
Weiner founded Preston Thorgrimson/Preston Gates Ellis’s environmental, land use, and natural 
resources practice after serving as Deputy Executive Director and Counsel for the White House 
Council on Environmental Quality under Presidents Carter and Ford (1976–1980). Mr. Weiner is a 
principal author of the federal National Environmental Policy Act Rules, the Washington State 
Environmental Policy Act Rules, and other federal, state, and local environmental and land use 
laws. He has counseled private companies, public clients, and nongovernmental organizations on 
environmental compliance, restoration, and sustainability for more than thirty years. He has written 
and taught extensively on environmental law and has served as adjunct faculty at the University of 
Washington School of Law. He has been married to Judge Fletcher’s daughter Kathy Fletcher, see 
infra note 68, since 1980—that is, since shortly after Judge Fletcher joined the Ninth Circuit. 
Although the author and the judge have not discussed active NEPA cases in the intervening thirty 
years, a matter of great judicial restraint for both of us, it is apparent we share an abiding 
appreciation for NEPA. 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006). 
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and language are constitutional in character. Widely recognized as the 
world’s first comprehensive statement of environmental policy, NEPA 
became a model for environmental policy and law around the globe. 
NEPA has and may continue to have as much “impact” as any 
environmental statute in history, even as we move into the twenty-first 
century challenge to confront global climate change.2 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Betty Binns Fletcher has 
profoundly understood and has steadfastly defended NEPA as our 
nation’s fundamental democratic response to respecting the earth and all 
the inhabitants thereof. For thirty years, she has strictly interpreted the 
law in accordance with its stated purpose: to achieve harmony between 
people and nature. As the judges who first required compliance with 
NEPA’s mandates retired or died—such as William O. Douglas and 
Thurgood Marshall on the Supreme Court, and Skelly Wright and 
Harold Leventhal on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals—the First and 
Ninth Circuits became the most stalwart keepers of NEPA’s flame. As 
we enter the new millennium, one judge stands out as the leading 
judicial interpreter of our nation’s environmental charter and its 
relevance to current issues: Judge Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit. 
While some federal agencies and courts seek to relegate NEPA to the 
dustbin (perhaps recycling box) of a paperwork exercise, Judge Fletcher 
has thoughtfully developed a NEPA jurisprudence that points the way to 
focus on the statute’s substantive goals, while respecting the procedural 
review role of the courts. As might be expected by her fans and critics 
alike, she has applied a rigorous analysis whose logic does not readily 
leave room for dissent. Even when Judge Fletcher’s decisions are 
reversed or when she is writing a minority opinion, those with whom she 
disagrees often use or borrow heavily from her legal analysis and differ 
instead on the interpretation of the facts. 
NEPA was passed by Congress in 1969, and we commemorate its 
fortieth anniversary this year.3 Judge Fletcher was confirmed a decade 
                                                     
2. See Kenneth S. Weiner, NEPA and State NEPAs: Learning from the Past, Foresight for the 
Future, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,675 (2009). 
3. See Symposium, NEPA at 40, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,575 (2009). NEPA has stood essentially 
unamended since its enactment, as have the 1978 Council on Environmental Quality NEPA Rules. 
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 815–17 (2d ed. 1994). Two presidential 
proclamations on NEPA aptly encompass Judge Fletcher’s tenure on the federal bench. The first, by 
President Jimmy Carter, who appointed Judge Fletcher, was issued on the occasion of NEPA’s first 
decade. Proclamation No. 4710, 45 Fed. Reg. 757 (Jan. 1, 1980). More recently, President Barack 
Obama recognized NEPA’s fortieth anniversary. Proclamation No. 8469, 75 Fed. Reg. 885 (Dec. 
31, 2009). Both proclamations highlight the values of environmental trusteeship and sustainability, 
and of government accountability, full disclosure, public participation and democracy that permeate 
Judge Fletcher’s NEPA jurisprudence. 
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later in 1979, and we honor her thirtieth anniversary on the bench this 
year. These milestones represent remarkable longevity for a statute and a 
judge. 
Despite this passage of time, in 2008 alone Judge Fletcher authored 
two landmark decisions on NEPA’s role on our society’s response to 
climate change and to the plight of our oceans and their species.4 These 
issues could not be more timely and central, at a local and global level, 
to the well-being of both the human species and life on earth. As much 
as any single person, Judge Fletcher reminds us that NEPA is relevant 
today. 
This Article explores Judge Fletcher’s NEPA jurisprudence, focusing 
on her singular contribution to resolving the tension between substance 
and procedure in judicial review. In short, the courts are required to hold 
federal agencies to a standard of strict compliance with NEPA’s 
procedural provisions, yet not to substitute their judgment for that of 
executive branch officials on substantive decisions about approving or 
conditioning proposed federal actions. Much of the substance of 
decisions affecting the environment—namely, whether national 
environmental policy goals are achieved—turns on the effectiveness of 
“mitigation measures” to avoid or otherwise ameliorate adverse 
environmental impacts. 
Judge Fletcher has developed a jurisprudence that holds agencies 
accountable for the quality of their NEPA analyses and documents 
relating to mitigation measures, while keeping within the existing 
doctrines of judicial review of administrative action and deference to the 
agency’s substantive decisionmaking role. The effect of these cases is to 
retain NEPA’s intended focus on substance while respecting the 
traditional review role of the courts. 
I. SUBSTANCE V. PROCEDURE FRAMES THE ISSUE 
The story must begin with an understanding of the famous NEPA 
case of Substance v. Procedure. If you know this “case” well, you can 
skip ahead to Part II—but be forewarned, Judge Fletcher’s jurisprudence 
is built on this foundation. 
                                                     
4. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 
2008); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.), rev’d, 555 U.S. __, 129 S. 
Ct. 365 (2008). 
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A. NEPA Requires Agencies to Think and Then Act 
At its core, NEPA places two basic mandates on all agencies of the 
federal government: (1) to think about the environmental consequences 
of their activities and decisions, and (2) to act to restore and protect 
environmental quality consistent with other essential considerations of 
national policy. The duty of federal agencies to think about the 
environment is NEPA’s procedural mandate. The duty of federal 
agencies to act to protect and restore the environment is NEPA’s 
substantive mandate.5 
The procedural and substantive mandates overlap in the key concept 
of “mitigation,” which means avoiding or otherwise reducing 
environmental damage that could result from a government action. 
Mitigation is one of the three types of alternatives that NEPA requires 
governmental officials to explore before making decisions.6 Exploring 
alternatives is the heart of the NEPA process, because NEPA’s 
substantive goal—to change government behavior, so that agencies 
protect the environment to the fullest extent possible—can be met only if 
the agencies look for a better way to carry out their business.7 
Mitigation measures are therefore substantive because they refer to 
actions the government will take to prevent environmental harm or 
improve the environment. The NEPA requirement to develop and 
explore alternatives, including mitigation measures, is procedural 
because it refers to the thinking process of giving a hard look to avoiding 
environmental impacts if you can.8 
                                                     
5. For a more complete explanation of NEPA’s mandates and role and a section-by-section 
explanation of the CEQ NEPA Rules, see Kenneth S. Weiner, Basic Policies and Purposes of the 
NEPA Regulations, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 61 (Ray 
Clark & Larry Canter eds., 1997). 
6. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2008). The other alternatives that officials must consider are a “no 
action” alternative and “other reasonable courses of action.” Id. § 1508.25. 
7. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1 (purpose of CEQ regulations), 1502.1 (purpose of environmental 
impact statement requirement), 1502.14 (alternatives as the “heart” of environmental impact 
statement), 1508.25 (definition of “scope” of environmental impact statement); Weiner, supra note 
5, at 74–77 (explaining these provisions and the meanings and misperceptions of mitigation); see 
also Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A Primer on an “Old” Law with Solutions to New Problems, 19 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,060, 10,065 (1989). 
8. Since NEPA’s enactment in 1970, and the subsequent enactment of many state NEPAs, 
proposed actions have improved dramatically by taking environmental quality into account from the 
outset. Prior to NEPA, agencies typically proposed actions that did not consider environmental 
quality. As agencies incorporated environmental review under NEPA, they began to develop 
different proposals than in the past, proposals that would often produce different and generally 
improved actions, particularly in contrast to pre-1970s actions. In addition, because NEPA greatly 
opened up the planning and decisionmaking process to the public, proposals are often developed in 
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Sections 101, 102(1), and 105 of NEPA provide the statute’s 
substantive mandate. Section 101 specifies goals for the federal 
government, making it national policy “to create and maintain conditions 
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony.”9 In 
section 102(1), Congress declared that to the fullest extent possible “the 
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be 
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in 
this Act . . . .”10 Section 105 makes the policies and goals set forth in the 
Act, principally in the declaration of national environmental policy in 
section 101, “supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations 
of Federal agencies.”11 Through section 105, NEPA added 
environmental protection and restoration to the underlying charter 
authority of every federal agency. 
Section 102(2)(F) could also be considered to be a directive to act, as 
it requires all federal agencies to “lend appropriate support to initiatives, 
resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international 
cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of 
mankind’s world environment. . . .”12 This provision could hardly have 
been more prescient forty years ago, nor could it be more timely today. 
Section 102(2) provides the statutory underpinning of the procedural 
mandate. With the possible exception of section 102(2)(F), as noted 
above, the other provisions of section 102(2) are directed toward 
producing good information about the environment, so that agencies can 
act on what they have learned. NEPA identifies fundamental criteria for 
developing good information. Most notably, section 102(2)(C) requires a 
“detailed statement” on the alternatives and environmental impacts of 
proposed major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
environment, now known as an “environmental impact statement” 
                                                     
a more participatory way with advice from other agencies, Indian tribes, businesses, communities, 
and interested parties (often called “stakeholders”). Because agencies and applicants for permits 
have given better attention to environmental factors and often work with affected parties from the 
outset, fewer outright environmentally-destructive projects are proposed. A proposal’s impacts may 
still be significant, severe, or simply important. Consequently, emphasis has shifted in many cases 
to mitigation measures that address the remaining impacts of a proposal. The role of mitigation 
measures and their efficacy has therefore become increasingly central to NEPA compliance, and the 
failure to address them may be fatal to the review of a proposed action. As noted in the introduction 
to this Article, Judge Fletcher’s decisions on procedural adequacy relative to mitigation measures 
mark an important and timely contribution to NEPA jurisprudence and have helped to dispel false 
polarities and diffuse misplaced debates over substance and procedure under NEPA. 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006). 
10. Id. § 4332(1). 
11. Id. § 4335. 
12. Id. § 4332(2)(F). 
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(EIS).13 This statement was meant to be both an accountability measure 
to assure agencies developed the necessary information, and an “action-
forcing” mechanism, on the theory that good information will lead to 
better, more informed decisions and actions.14 
Both the EIS and the environmental assessment (EA) discussed below 
were intended as accountability and transparency measures, to document 
that agencies followed NEPA’s injunctions to give appropriate 
consideration to environmental values in their planning and decisions.15 
These environmental values are articulated in the national environmental 
policy set forth in section 101 of NEPA.16 These policies include: 
 fulfilling the responsibilities of each generation as a trustee of 
the environmental for succeeding generations; 
 attaining the widest range of beneficial uses of the 
environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or 
other undesirable and unintended consequences; and 
 preserving important historical, cultural and natural aspects 
of our national heritage, and maintaining, wherever possible, 
an environment which supports diversity, and a variety of 
individual choice. 
In today’s terms, this policy is called “sustainability” and includes 
taking actions today that will also preserve or enhance resources and 
options for future generations. 
B. The Executive Branch Acts to Implement NEPA’s Original Intent 
The above primer provides a brief background on the meaning of 
“substance” and “procedure” under NEPA. The roles and interplay 
among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal 
government are equally important to understand judicial review under 
                                                     
13. Id. § 4332(2)(C). 
14. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 2–4 (1973); see also Lynton K. Caldwell, 
Implementing NEPA: A Non-Technical Political Task, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA, 
supra note 5, at 40–41; 4 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.01[3] (2009); 
Lynton K. Caldwell, The National Environmental Policy Act: Retrospect and Prospect, 6 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 50,030, 50,033 (1976) [hereinafter Caldwell, Retrospect and Prospect] (“The impact statement 
was required to force the agencies to take the substantive provisions of the Act seriously, and to 
consider the environmental policy directives of the Congress in the formulation of agency plans and 
procedures.”); Nicholas Yost & Gary Widman, The “Action-Forcing” Requirements of NEPA and 
Ongoing Actions of the Federal Government, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,435, 10,436–37 (2004) 
(explaining how NEPA’s “action-forcing” provisions ensure that federal agencies “act according to 
the letter and spirit of the statute”). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B). 
16. Id. § 4331. 
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NEPA. In this regard, NEPA’s origins are relevant.17 
Despite urban legend to the contrary, NEPA’s drafters on the Senate 
committee staff were aware of the potentially powerful tool created 
through the statute’s EIS requirement.18 In contrast, most of the 
members of Congress sponsoring NEPA expected the statute’s legacy to 
be a high-sounding statement of noncontroversial principles and the 
establishment of a permanent White House presence to raise newly-
articulated national environmental policy goals to the highest levels in 
government. 
Prime sponsors of NEPA from both the Senate and the House 
believed that the lasting legacy and biggest “environmental impact” of 
NEPA would be the establishment of the White House Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) with a lead environmental advisor to the 
President. As experienced Washington insiders in a time of a strong 
presidency, they understood the power that a top White House official 
with an adequate staff can have in shaping policy and accomplishing 
change. 
CEQ was modeled after the National Security Council and the 
Council of Economic Advisors in the Executive Office of the President 
(the extended White House family, which includes other powerful 
offices such as the Office of Management and Budget).19 Senator 
Edmund S. Muskie even deferred to Senator Henry M. Jackson on the 
prime sponsorship of NEPA in the Senate, because Senator Muskie was 
satisfied with the compromise that he would be the prime sponsor of the 
companion measure to NEPA, the Environmental Quality Improvement 
Act,20 which provided staff to CEQ, as he felt would be the lasting 
contribution of NEPA. 
The Congressional sponsors saw NEPA first and foremost as a 
government management statute, directing the federal agencies to 
change the way they did business and to protect, restore, and enhance 
environmental quality in carrying out their missions.21 As with Theodore 
                                                     
17. For a more extensive treatment, see LYNTON K. CALDWELL, THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 22–47 (1998). 
18. Caldwell, Retrospect and Prospect, supra note 14, at 50,032 (“Contrary to some journalistic 
conjecture, the action-forcing provisions were not added to the NEPA as a last-minute afterthought. 
The need for language to make the Act operational was recognized early in the drafting stage.”). 
19. See Caldwell, supra note 17, at 37–40; Weiner, supra note 2, at 10,675–76. Additional 
illuminating legislative history on CEQ and Congressional focus on this aspect of the evolving 
NEPA legislation can be found in the original bill reports and floor debate, many of which have 
been compiled and analyzed in GRAD, supra note 14, § 9.01[4], and summarized in § 9.01[4][h]. 
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371–75 (2006). 
21. Caldwell, Retrospect and Prospect, supra note 14, at 50,033 (“The impact statement was 
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Roosevelt’s vision for the U.S. Forest Service and many New Deal and 
Great Society reforms, NEPA’s sponsors saw the federal government as 
providing a model, proving to the private sector that environmental 
quality was integral to, and compatible with, economic and social well-
being nationally and internationally.22 
President Nixon quickly issued an Executive Order directing agencies 
to comply with NEPA and authorizing CEQ to oversee its 
implementation.23 CEQ promptly issued guidelines to agencies to 
prepare EISs.24 
Perhaps most significantly, these guidelines required agencies to 
prepare “draft” EISs, officially opening up agency planning on major 
projects and plans affecting the environment and natural resources for 
public review for the first time.25 Few people realize that review and 
participation by the public and by Indian tribes was not then—and still is 
not—in the NEPA statute itself. 
CEQ created a second powerful tool, the environmental assessment 
(EA), for situations where proposals did not have big impacts, but would 
still affect the environment. The EA requirement was equally far-
reaching, not only because it requires examination of “alternatives” but 
because it applies to thousands of federal actions annually, compared to 
                                                     
required to force the agencies to take the substantive provisions of [NEPA] seriously, and to 
consider the environmental policy directives of the Congress in the formulation of agency plans and 
procedures.”). 
22. See Weiner, supra note 2, at 10,676. This parallel is ironic because of the number of cases on 
which Judge Fletcher has sat challenging whether the U.S. Forest Service was meeting its 
environmental stewardship obligations. See infra Part II. 
23. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (Mar. 5, 1970). Executive Order 11,514 had a 
significant amendment when President Carter issued Executive Order 11,991, directing CEQ to 
issue binding government-wide NEPA regulations. 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 24, 1977). Building 
on Executive Order 11,514, President Obama expanded CEQ’s role in environmental sustainability 
under Executive Order 13,514, working with the Office of Management and Budget. 74 Fed. Reg. 
52,117 (Oct. 5, 2009). One can expect that each agency’s senior sustainability officer designated 
under Executive Order 13,514 will in time have responsibility for the agency’s progress in meeting 
NEPA’s goals. 
24. CEQ issued interim NEPA Guidelines in 1971, final NEPA Guidelines in 1973, and final 
NEPA Rules in 1978. See RODGERS, supra note 3, § 9.2; Weiner, supra note 5, at 64–65. 
Chapter One of ANDERSON, supra note 14, has an excellent summary of the legislative background 
on NEPA (its discussion of the executive branch’s oversight of NEPA and CEQ is outdated, 
however). GRAD, supra note 14, § 9.01, contains a good update on CEQ. This article and 
subsequent case law (including many cases cited in this article) note CEQ’s regulatory and 
oversight role, which has become well-established over the past forty years. 
In keeping with the full disclosure required by NEPA, the author joined CEQ in 1976 to write the 
NEPA Rules and is a principal author of the current government-wide CEQ NEPA Rules. 
25. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a) (2008). 
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the small number of EISs that are prepared.26 
NEPA, through the NEPA rules, is among the most democratic of 
laws. It does not proscribe or prescribe conduct (hence the rap that it’s 
not substantive). Instead, it sets performance goals and requires clear 
thinking by agencies and encourages civil debate by experts and citizens. 
NEPA depends on and promotes democracy. The government is not 
omniscient—the public has a right to know, and the voices of individuals 
with good ideas must be heard. 
When one looks at Judge Fletcher’s jurisprudence in all areas of the 
law, and her respect for the democratic process and the individual who 
faces abuses of power, as reflected in all of the articles in this special 
issue of the Washington Law Review, one can see why the Judge and 
NEPA are the perfect match. 
C. NEPA’s Early Cases Review Substantive and Procedural 
Compliance 
The early NEPA cases lay the foundation for this tribute to Judge 
Fletcher. When federal agencies began preparing their procedures to 
implement NEPA and their first EAs and EISs, many were cursory or 
were justifications of planned projects. 
It was unclear at this early point in its history whether NEPA had any 
teeth. The statute does not contain an explicit enforcement or judicial 
review provision. CEQ was new, relatively small, and had its hands full 
with a host of domestic and global environmental initiatives. As the 
White House family’s environmental staff, CEQ’s clout depends on the 
President’s interest and support. Relying heavily on the advice of his 
chief Domestic Policy advisor John Ehrlichman, a former Seattle 
environmental and land use lawyer, President Nixon embraced the 
politics of the environment, but it was not a personal priority for him. 
Would the federal bureaucracy gain the upper hand and turn NEPA 
into an empty exercise, one more piece of paperwork before proceeding 
as planned? 
The first cases changed the course of history, here and abroad, by 
giving NEPA teeth. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinated Committee v. Atomic 
Energy Commission27 was the first landmark opinion interpreting NEPA, 
and remains perhaps the most famous NEPA case. The D.C. Circuit 
Court decision upheld a challenge by a citizen group, confirming the 
right both to judicial review and to public enforcement under NEPA. 
                                                     
26. See RODGERS, supra note 3, § 9.5. 
27. 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). 
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The court rejected the Atomic Energy Commission’s NEPA procedures, 
overturning the agency’s action on the basis of NEPA through the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),28 and establishing that NEPA was 
not a vague policy statement but had enforceable mandatory 
requirements. No longer did NEPA compliance depend solely on CEQ 
oversight or internal executive branch politics. D.C. Circuit Court Judge 
Skelly Wright declared that Congress did not intend the Act to be “a 
paper tiger.”29 
In doing so, the courts confronted the fundamental issue of substance 
versus procedure. 
Calvert Cliffs set precedent by walking the line between the two, in a 
time-honored interpretation of the APA and judicial review of agency 
action. NEPA’s procedural provisions require strict compliance. The 
court’s “hard look” at “strict procedural compliance” employs a “rule of 
reason” so that “reasonably foreseeable” environmental consequences 
are examined, not “remote and speculative” impacts.30 The court wrote: 
“Indeed, the requirement of environmental consideration ‘to the fullest 
extent possible’ sets a high standard for the agencies, a standard which 
must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts.”31 
Calvert Cliffs noted, with regard to how an agency applies the 
substantive provisions of section 101, that NEPA does not mandate a 
“particular substantive result,”32 but this did not mean section 101 was 
irrelevant. The court acknowledged its ability to review or alter the 
agencies’ choice of the course of action after meeting NEPA procedural 
requirements was limited. Calvert Cliffs followed long-standing APA 
case law that a court cannot simply substitute its judgment for the 
agency, but could review and reverse agency action that was arbitrary 
and capricious under the statute.33 
The D.C. Circuit understood the “think” and “act” connection in 
NEPA, and concluded that agency action would be arbitrary and 
reversible if the “thinking” didn’t include the values NEPA requires to 
be considered: 
We conclude, then, that Section 102 of NEPA mandates a 
particular sort of careful and informed decisionmaking process 
                                                     
28. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2006). 
29. Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1114. 
30. See GRAD, supra note 14, § 9.03[3][a]; DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND 
LITIGATION §§ 3.3, 3.7, 9.19 (2d ed. 1992). 
31. Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d. at 1114. 
32. Id. at 1112. 
33. Id. at 1115. 
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and creates judicially enforceable duties. The reviewing courts 
probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits, 
under Section 101, unless it be shown that the actual balance of 
costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave 
insufficient weight to environmental values. But if the decision 
was reached procedurally without individualized consideration 
and balancing of environmental factors—conducted fully and in 
good faith—it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse.34 
Later in the decade, in a successful challenge to the adequacy of 
NEPA compliance on the Gillham Dam, the Eighth Circuit went further 
to state: 
Given an agency obligation to carry out the substantive 
requirements of the Act, we believe that courts have an 
obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits. 
Whether we look to common law or the Administrative 
Procedure Act, absent “legislative guidance as to reviewability, 
an administrative determination affecting legal rights is 
reviewable unless some special reason appears for not 
reviewing.” Here, important legal rights are affected. NEPA is 
silent as to judicial review, and no special reasons appear for not 
reviewing the decision of the agency. To the contrary, the 
prospect of substantive review should improve the quality of 
agency decisions and should make it more likely that the broad 
purposes of NEPA will be realized.35 
This was the high water mark of NEPA substantive review, and has 
led to confusion and a classic polarization that has plagued NEPA’s 
interpretation ever since, as discussed below, which Judge Fletcher’s 
opinions have sought to elucidate and overcome. 
D. The Supremes Weigh in and Back off on NEPA’s Substantive 
Mandate 
At this point in the late 1970s, the first NEPA cases began to reach 
the U.S. Supreme Court. In a series of cases from 1976 to 1980, 
beginning with Kleppe v. Sierra Club,36 the Supreme Court emphasized 
that a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of an 
agency and also should not interject itself within the area of discretion of 
                                                     
34. Id. 
35. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs of the U.S. Army, 470 F.2d 289, 299 (8th Cir. 1978) 
(internal citation omitted). 
36. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
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the executive on the choice of alternatives.37 
Two years after Kleppe, the Supreme Court decided Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.38 In 
rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s decision that it was reasonable to study 
energy conservation alternatives to the construction of a new nuclear 
plant, Justice Rehnquist expanded on the substitution of judgment on the 
merits to describe NEPA’s mandate as “essentially procedural,”39 which 
forever changed the perception of NEPA and the force of judicial 
review: 
NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, 
but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural. It is to 
insure a fully informed and well considered decision, not 
necessarily a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or of 
this Court would have reached had they been members of the 
decisionmaking unit of the agency. Administrative decisions 
should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for 
substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by 
statute, not simply because the court is unhappy with the result 
reached. And a single alleged oversight on a peripheral issue, 
urged by parties who never fully cooperated or indeed raised the 
issue below, must not be made the basis for overturning a 
decision properly made after an otherwise exhaustive 
proceeding.40 
Later, in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,41 the Court stopped 
construction of the Tellico Dam because of the failure of the Interior 
Department to comply with Endangered Species Act protections for the 
snail darter, a small fish. In contrasting the Endangered Species Act 
substantive prohibition on “take” of endangered species to NEPA’s 
provisions, the Court repeated the Vermont Yankee epithet in a side 
comment: “[T]he two statutes serve different purposes. NEPA 
essentially imposes a procedural requirement on agencies.”42 
 Finally, in Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen,43 the 
Supreme Court rejected a Second Circuit decision that required the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development to examine alternative 
                                                     
37. See, e.g., id. at 410 n.21. 
38. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
39. Id. at 558. 
40. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
41. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
42. Id. at 188 n.34. 
43. 444 U.S. 223 (1980). 
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sites for a housing project in order to avoid or mitigate the impacts of 
crowding low income housing into a concentrated urban area. The 
Second Circuit rejected the agency’s objection to taking two more years 
to study the proposed project.44 In a per curiam decision, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the lower court was substituting its judgment for that of 
the agency.45 Justice Marshall wrote an eloquent dissent, distinguishing 
between directing the agency where to locate the housing—which was 
nowhere in the Court of Appeals decision—and allowing review of the 
agency’s decision to proceed with the project without analyzing 
alternative sites: 
 In the present case, the Court of Appeals did not “substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental 
consequences of its actions” . . . . 
 The issue before the Court of Appeals, therefore, was whether 
HUD was free under NEPA to reject an alternative 
acknowledged to be environmentally preferable solely on the 
ground that any change in sites would cause delay. This was 
hardly a “peripheral issue” in the case. Whether NEPA, which 
sets forth “significant substantive goals,” permits a projected 2-
year time difference to be controlling over environmental 
superiority is by no means clear. Resolution of the issue, 
however, is certainly within the normal scope of review of 
agency action to determine if it is arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion.46 
The burgeoning idea that the courts could decide whether an agency 
gave insufficient weight to environmental values even under a narrow 
standard was effectively quashed by this series of decisions by the 
Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist’s overbroad but superficially 
appealing assertion, that the judges with whom he disagreed were simply 
overturning decisions on the merits and substituting their preferences for 
the agency’s, carried the day. Notably, the Court has not overruled 
Calvert Cliffs or many of the other seminal NEPA cases. 
The culmination of this line of cases came in the twin Supreme Court 
decisions from the Ninth Circuit and Pacific Northwest, the Robertson 
                                                     
44. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1978). 
45. Strycker’s Bay, 444 U.S. at 227. Justice Marshall’s dissent includes a footnote in which he 
cites to the record, observing that even executive branch officials understood they could be called to 
task for failing to give appropriate consideration to environmental values, as required by NEPA: 
“The Secretary concedes that if an agency gave little or no weight to environmental values its 
decision might be arbitrary or capricious.” Id. at 231 n.* (Marshall, J. dissenting). 
46. Id. at 229–31 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (citation omitted). 
Weiner DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2010 2:23 PM 
58 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:45 
 
and Marsh cases.47 Although the Marsh line of cases requires mitigation 
to be analyzed, the Court stated in Robertson: “NEPA does not impose a 
substantive duty on agencies to mitigate adverse environmental effects 
or to include in each EIS a fully developed mitigation plan.”48 The 
Supreme Court continued to cast NEPA as procedural, a recital that 
spread like wildfire through the lower courts. 
In summary, the Court’s NEPA jurisprudence has generally been to 
circumscribe NEPA for a number of reasons. Chief among them seem to 
be: (1) NEPA cases require detailed attention to the record to be fairly 
adjudicated; in this regard, they seem to have an uncanny relationship to 
death penalty, criminal, and immigration cases, not surprisingly areas of 
Judge Fletcher’s major contributions; (2) NEPA is an overarching statute 
that “overlays” or injects discretion in any governmental action, 
discretion which is theoretically reviewable and thus increases access to 
the courts and potential court workload; (3) there have been relatively 
few Supreme Court justices with a strong environmental appreciation; 
and (4) almost since NEPA’s enactment, the Supreme Court has 
generally become more conservative with regard to access to the courts 
and judicial review of executive branch action. 
E. Getting the Terms of the Substance v. Procedure Debate Straight 
For many, particularly in the environmental public interest sector and 
academia, NEPA has “substance” only if a court can reverse the 
agency’s decision as violating section 101 of NEPA. For others, 
particularly many federal agencies that have learned “to play the game,” 
NEPA is a process and paper exercise, where the role of judicial review 
is limited to determining whether an agency followed the proper steps in 
the process, regardless of the quality of its analysis.49 
                                                     
47. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Marsh v. Or. Natural 
Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989). Judge Fletcher wrote the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Marsh 
case, which was part of a long series of cases. See infra note 67. 
48. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 333. 
49. A noteworthy result of the Supreme Court reviewing one of Judge Fletcher’s Marsh decisions 
is that the Supreme Court charged the lower courts with a careful review of the record, not simply 
acceptance of conclusory documents by the agency: 
[I]n the context of reviewing a decision not to supplement an EIS, courts should not 
automatically defer to the agency’s express reliance on an interest in finality without carefully 
reviewing the record and satisfying themselves that the agency has made a reasoned decision 
based on its evaluation of the significance—or lack of significance—of the new information. 
Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378. 
There is another dimension of Substance v. Procedure that should be clarified, as some states 
assert their state NEPAs are “substantive” in contrast to NEPA. One of the biggest issues for the 
state NEPAs was whether public and private actions could be conditioned or denied based on 
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Both of these views of NEPA’s “substantive” authority miss the 
point. The Congress and the Supreme Court are unlikely to reverse 
history, change NEPA or the APA, and allow the courts to substitute 
their judgment for informed agency decisions on the merits using broad 
language of section 10150 as the yardstick. Agency decisions on projects, 
programs, plans and policies are an executive branch prerogative, 
subject to congressional direction and limited judicial review. The 
greatest strength of the NEPA process is its reliance on democracy: by 
opening up an agency process to public participation and agency review, 
people can change the course of their government’s actions. 
But there is a relationship between substance and procedure in NEPA 
judicial review that those who would polarize the issue of Substance v. 
Procedure have missed, but which the late Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
the late Judges Skelly Wright and Harold Leventhal, and Judge Betty 
Fletcher, among others, have not. 
In brief, there are advocates for allowing a court to reverse an agency 
decision on the merits as violating the broad standards in section 101 
(i.e., what the Supreme Court has denounced as the court substituting its 
judgment for the agency under the statute as it presently exists).51 At the 
other end of the spectrum, there are advocates for allowing courts to 
defer to virtually any agency consideration of environmental factors, 
without scrutinizing the quality of the agency’s analysis. 
At the center, a court would reverse and remand an agency decision if 
the agency did not give appropriate consideration to the environmental 
values articulated in NEPA; that is, if the agency disregarded 
information, including unquantified environmental values, that should 
have been considered, or if the agency acts without considering 
environmental consequences. This is a procedural determination within 
the ambit of traditional judicial review of whether administration action 
is arbitrary and capricious. Judge Fletcher’s NEPA jurisprudence 
                                                     
environmental impacts. For many states, this is “substantive.” This was never an issue with NEPA, 
for which this type of “substantive” authority is fully accepted by the courts. See supra note 14 and 
accompanying text. Instead, “substantive” in the federal context refers to a court reversing an 
agency decision for noncompliance with the policies of NEPA set forth in section 101 of the Act. 
See Weiner, supra note 2, at 10,677. 
50. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
51. Recall that judicial review occurs under the APA, as NEPA does not contain judicial review 
provisions. Congress could amend NEPA to allow judicial review of compliance with section 101 
or, more narrowly, to provide expressly for judicial review of actual compliance with mitigation 
commitments (not simply currently available procedural review of whether the reasonably 
foreseeable effects of alternatives, including proposed mitigation measures, have been adequately 
analyzed). 
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generally falls within this center. 
II.  JUDGE FLETCHER’S LEGACY: EFFECTIVENESS OF 
MITIGATION MEASURES 
Judge Fletcher’s contribution—namely, reinvigorating NEPA’s 
substantive mandate by strictly enforcing NEPA’s procedural mandate 
under the “rule of reason,” while remaining respectful of the limits of 
judicial review—is reflected in the following four cases, one for each 
decade of her tenure on the bench.52 To make the development of this 
jurisprudence easier to follow, all of these examples involve 
management of public forest lands, but the legal doctrines apply to any 
governmental actions involving mitigation measures. 
The first case, Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark,53 involved a challenge 
to annual herbicide spraying on public lands in Oregon by the Bureau of 
Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service under their respective 
local management plans. Some of these herbicides contained dioxin, and 
according to the record, soon after spraying commenced, serious health 
problems were reported “including spontaneous abortions, birth defects 
in humans and animals, and various other illnesses.”54 
The Forest Service’s defense was that the herbicides were registered 
and approved for use by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) under another law, so the Forest Service did not have a duty to do 
further analysis of the environmental effects of the herbicides. In short, 
                                                     
52. The following cases will be highlighted as examples in this article: Save Our Ecosystems v. 
Clark, 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984); Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 
1208 (9th Cir. 1998); Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005); Neighbors of 
Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Service, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1997). In addition, brief mention 
will be made of Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 52 F.3d 1485 (9th Cir. 1995). and 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.), rev’d, 555 U.S. __, 129 
S. Ct. 365 (2008). Both Marsh and Winter illustrate the principles discussed in the this Article; 
however, these two cases have such complicated procedural histories—with multiple rulings 
spanning years of district court, circuit court, and Supreme Court review—that a brief article cannot 
do them justice. In the Winter case, involving the impact on whales of sonar use in Navy exercises 
(where Judge Fletcher’s decision was ultimately reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court), all 
three separate opinions accepted the premise that the Ninth Circuit appropriately focused on 
mitigation measures in reviewing the Navy’s proposed action. See Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 375 
(majority) (holding that district court erred by not reconsidering injunction in light of Navy’s 
voluntary acceptance of four mitigation measures); id. at 386 (Breyer, J. concurring) (“I would 
remand so the District Court could, pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ direction, set forth mitigation 
conditions that will protect the marine wildlife while also enabling the Navy to carry out its 
exercises.”); id. at 391 n.2 (Ginsburg, J. concurring) (noting with approval Ninth Circuit’s “detailed 
analysis of the record” with regard to imposition of mitigation measures). 
53. 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984). 
54. Id. at 1243. 
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the use of a registered herbicide avoids or otherwise mitigates potential 
adverse environmental impacts. 
Judge Fletcher’s opinion affirmed the lower court decision that the 
Forest Service was required to study the effects of applying the herbicide 
in the area it proposes to spray. In other words, it’s not the Forest 
Service’s job to register the herbicide, but it is the Forest Service’s job to 
know and to control how and where the herbicide is used. The decision 
notes the Forest Service could consider EPA or chemical company data 
or undertake its own research, or do both, but either way, the Forest 
Service would need to provide an adequate analysis of the effects of its 
spraying program in the targeted area. 
This decision reflects the early stage of Judge Fletcher’s NEPA 
“jurisprudence of transparency” to hold the government accountable for 
promises that federal actions will not harm the environment. Without 
such accountability, NEPA would be a “paper tiger,” to use Judge Skelly 
Wright’s phrase. 
In Blue Mountains Diversity Project v. Blackwood,55 environmental 
groups sought to enjoin thirty million board-feet of timber salvage sales 
in an area of the Umatilla National Forest in Oregon that had been 
burned by wildfires until the U.S. Forest Service prepared an EIS on the 
proposed logging. The Forest Service had prepared an EA and “finding 
of no significant impact” (EA/FONSI). 
The potential for soil erosion and the resulting flow of sediment into 
streams are common issues with large-scale logging operations, both 
from the road building and logging operations.56 The court found that the 
EA/FONSI gave “cursory and inconsistent treatment” to the 
sedimentation issue, with the Forest Service asserting that the erosion 
and sedimentation would be small compared to that caused by the fire.57 
Most importantly, the Forest Service said that use of “best 
                                                     
55. 161 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998). 
56. While some sedimentation naturally replenishes creek and streambeds, too much sediment 
causes a number of serious problems, including impairing or destroying fish spawning areas and 
other habitat. Much of this habitat is now critical to salmon and other fish runs that have become 
endangered, in part because of these historical human activities. The long-term controversy of 
timber operations in the Pacific Northwest, as well as in other areas of the nation and the world, is 
focused on this issue, and most habitat conservation plans focus on a wide range of actions to 
restore streams and prevent these impacts. These processes are well-documented in numerous 
reports dating from President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration to the present. See, e.g., U.S. 
Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. & U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Final EIS for the Proposed Issuance of 
Multiple Species Incidental Take Permits or 4(d) Rules for the Washington State Forest Practices § 
3.8 (2006), available at http://www.dnr.wa.gov/BusinessPermits/Topics/ForestPracticesHCP/Pages/ 
fp_hcp_feis.aspx (discussing impact of sediment on aquatic life). 
57. Blue Mountain Diversity Project, 161 F.3d at 1213. 
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management practices” would mitigate the potential impact for salvage 
logging of a large burned area. True to form, Judge Fletcher’s decision 
reflects a careful reading of the record on appeal. It turns out the Forest 
Service was relying on best management practices based on observations 
of unburned areas.58 
Judge Fletcher’s opinion plainly stated that the court found nothing in 
the EA/FONSI to support a conclusion that this mitigation measure will 
be adequate in a severely burned area where increased erosion has 
already occurred.59 Here is a brief, but full-fledged manifestation of 
using procedural requirements to achieve substantive environmental 
goals, within the role of limited judicial review and precisely as intended 
by NEPA’s “action-forcing” procedures. 
Judge Fletcher and her colleagues did not substitute their judgment 
for the Forest Service’s on what mitigation measures, if any, should be 
employed. However, they did not find in the record of the NEPA 
analysis a “hard look” at whether mitigation measures based on 
unburned forests would be effective to control impacts in a severely 
burned forest. This direct logic and well-placed procedural rigor put the 
focus back on NEPA’s substantive goals of trusteeship and 
sustainability—of finding and using alternatives that do not degrade and 
help to restore the environment.60 NEPA, as noted earlier in this Article, 
intended federal agencies to be laboratories and models of 
environmental stewardship for the private sector. 
The next case, from Judge Fletcher’s third decade on the bench, is 
interesting because the Forest Service proposed an action—a permit for 
commercial logging and burning in old growth forest stands in the Lolo 
National Forest in Idaho—that was itself cast as a measure to mitigate 
the effects of a large forest fire. In Ecology Center v. Austin,61 the Forest 
Service described its proposal as rehabilitative treatment of old growth 
                                                     
58. Id. at 1214. 
59. Id. Pointing out the incongruity of applying mitigation measures based on unburned forests 
was not the only gem in Judge Fletcher’s careful record review and opinion. Sedimentation is often 
measured by placing boxes in streams to measure the amount and/or rate of sedimentation. In 
reviewing the adequacy of the studies by the Forest Service—which asserted that sedimentation was 
not expected to be a problem and, as noted above, was using a mitigation measure based on 
unburned forests—the opinion notes, with perhaps a touch of ironic humor: “We find no 
documentation of the estimated sediment that would result from the logging and accompanying 
road-building or the impacts of increased sediment on fisheries habitat. The Forest Service’s only 
attempt to measure sedimentation failed when its data collection box overloaded with sediment.” Id. 
at 1213 (emphasis added). 
60. Without Judge Fletcher’s legendary attention to the record, one might easily imagine an 
unfounded charge that some activist judge was substituting her judgment for the agency’s. 
61. 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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and potential old growth forest stands. The treatment would consist of 
thinning the forest by commercial logging and burning. The objective 
was to improve the habitat by, among other things, leaving the best trees 
in place. 
The court took a hard look at the agency’s logic for promising that the 
mitigation measures would result in a healthier forest and improved 
habitat. The decision concluded that the Forest Service had not tested 
this theory or monitored other forests where these “treatment” methods 
had been used. Given the uncertainty about the effectiveness of the 
proposed mitigation, the court concluded the environmental impact 
needed more study (under NEPA) and caused unacceptable harm (under 
the forest management laws): 
This is not a case in which the Forest Service is asking for the 
opportunity to verify its theory of the benefits of old-growth 
treatment. Rather, the Service is asking us to grant it the license 
to continue treating old-growth forests while excluding it from 
ever having to verify that such treatment is not harmful.62 
One other late 1990s case bears mention because Judge Fletcher’s 
opinion for the court so clearly states the full measure of her contribution 
to a doctrine of accountability for mitigation. As always, her opinion is 
written in the details of the case before the court, but the doctrine is fully 
developed and articulated. In Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. 
Forest Service,63 several groups challenged a timber sale in the 
Grade/Dukes area of Cuddy Mountain in the Payette National Forest in 
Idaho. The Forest Service EIS concluded there would be increased 
sedimentation in three creeks, but did not propose any mitigation 
measures for those creeks. Instead, the Forest Service discussion of 
mitigation measures noted that the impacts would be compensated by 
improvements in other drainages. Citing other Supreme Court and Ninth 
Circuit precedents, Judge Fletcher’s opinion notes that “mere listing of 
mitigation measures is insufficient to qualify as the reasoned discussion 
required by NEPA” and goes on to explain: 
                                                     
62. Id. at 1064. Regarded as an excellent writer, Judge Fletcher is not known for rhetorical 
flourishes. Her Ecology Center opinion contains a rare exception to make a point (recognizing the 
split infinitive was intentional): 
Just as it would be arbitrary and capricious for a pharmaceutical company to market a drug to the 
general population without first conducting a clinical trial to verify that the drug is safe and 
effective, it is arbitrary and capricious for the Forest Service to irreversibly “treat” more and 
more old-growth forest without first determining that such treatment is safe and effective for 
dependent species. 
Id. 
63. 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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 While acknowledging that the Grade/Dukes sale would 
negatively impact the redband trout by increasing sedimentation 
levels, the Forest Service did not discuss which (or whether) 
mitigating measures might decrease the increased sedimentation 
in the three creeks affected by the timber sale. In fact, we read 
the EIS as suggesting that the Forest Service did not even 
consider mitigating measures for the creeks actually affected by 
the sale, apparently because the Forest Service believes that 
mitigating measures elsewhere in Payette could “compensate” 
for the harms caused to the three creeks in the Grade/Dukes 
area. It is also not clear whether any mitigating measures would 
in fact be adopted. Nor has the Forest Service provided an 
estimate of how effective the mitigation measures would be if 
adopted, or given a reasoned explanation as to why such an 
estimate is not possible. The Forest Service’s own experts 
suggest that the mitigation measures suggested by the Forest 
Service “are not mitigation and are so general that it would be 
impossible to determine where, how, and when they would be 
used and how effective they would be.” 
 The Forest Service’s broad generalizations and vague 
references to mitigation measures in relation to the streams 
affected by the Grade/Dukes project do not constitute the detail 
as to mitigation measures that would be undertaken, and their 
effectiveness, that the Forest Service is required to provide.64 
Judge Fletcher has nailed it: empty promises to “do right” by the 
environment do not comply with NEPA. In her careful and logical 
opinions, she has shown how courts can appropriately use their review 
of NEPA procedural compliance to keep focused on the substance. 
This review would be remiss if it did not recognize one other area of 
Judge Fletcher’s significant impact on NEPA jurisprudence: cumulative 
effects. Cumulative impacts (or effects) refer to the additive or 
synergistic environmental consequence of multiple actions occurring in 
the same area or affecting the same resource. The Ninth Circuit has long 
been a leading court on cumulative impact cases, in part because of the 
large ecosystems and the developing metropolitan areas in the circuit. 
Key cases have dealt with issues ranging from watersheds65 to highway 
systems.66 
                                                     
64. Id. at 1381 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
65. Pres. Our Island v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. C08-1353RSM, 2009 WL 2511953 
(W.D. Wash., Apr. 13, 2009). 
66. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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Judge Fletcher has often reminded federal agencies of the need to 
look beyond their own actions and understand the effect their action is 
having in combination with other activities their own agency or other 
people are taking.67 She well understands the principle of the “tragedy of 
the commons”—where common resources, such as land, water, air, fish 
and wildlife, are decimated by the incremental actions of many people 
over time. Even forty years after the first Earth Day and enactment of 
most of our current environmental laws, the fundamental problems with 
our air and water quality at home, and with the earth’s oceans and 
atmosphere, largely result from cumulative impacts. 
The issues in the cases above are not limited to the forestlands of the 
Oregon and Idaho, nor is the resulting NEPA jurisprudence. NEPA was 
enacted to change the way the U.S. Government did business, so that 
every federal agency would be an environmental leader. That goal is as 
relevant today, as the world faces the challenges of climate change, as it 
was in 1970 when the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals first gave “teeth” 
to NEPA. 
CONCLUSION: JUDGE FLETCHER’S LEGACY OF SUBSTANTIVE 
FOCUS WITHIN JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
These things matter. NEPA, these cases, and these abstract-sounding 
principles have real-life consequences for people and our environment. 
It’s the substance that counts.68 
                                                     
67. The Marsh line of cases highlights Judge Fletcher’s leading opinions on the requirement to 
consider cumulative impacts, which were also addressed in several of the cases discussed in this 
Article, including Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain, supra notes 63–64, and Blue Mountains Diversity 
Project, supra notes 55–59. In short, the Marsh cases involved a series of proposals relating to dams 
in the Rogue River Basin in Oregon. Congress authorized a three-dam project in 1962. The Corps 
issued an EIS in the early 1970s and began construction. The Corps’s EISs and decisions on the 
preparation of supplemental EISs were challenged through the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, including one 
case which reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1989—Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resource Council, 
490 U.S. 360 (1989). Most of the litigation was focused on the partially constructed Elk Creek 
Project, upstream of a wild and scenic river portion of the river. In a 1995 remand to the district 
court, Judge Fletcher wrote the majority opinion that found the Corps’s second supplemental EIS 
still did not adequately evaluate the cumulative impacts of the Corps’s proposal on fish along with 
the other dams in the basin. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Marsh, 52 F.3d 1485 (9th Cir. 1995). 
68. The author acknowledges the comments in this paragraph were made by Kathy Fletcher at the 
University of Washington Symposium: A Tribute to the Honorable Betty Binns Fletcher. In 1991, 
Kathy Fletcher founded, and currently serves as executive director of People For Puget Sound, 
which advocates for restoration and protection of the Puget Sound, one of the nation’s great 
estuaries. Ms. Fletcher, a biologist by background, has co-taught at the University of Washington 
School of Law with Professor William H. Rodgers. Ms. Fletcher is a NEPA expert in her own right, 
formerly as staff scientist for the Environmental Defense Fund in Colorado in the 1970s and 
Assistant Director of the White House Domestic Policy Staff from 1976–1978, when the CEQ 
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Whether we increase fuel efficiency standards, subject whales to 
sonar, log temperate rainforests, run a highway through a neighborhood, 
or dam a stream with a salmon or trout run, people’s lives will change. 
Our air, water, and land will be more or less able to sustain us and fellow 
species. The premise of NEPA is not to retreat to an idealized past, but 
that we do a better job living with nature for the future. 
In her tenure on the court, Judge Fletcher has made an extraordinary 
contribution to preserving and revitalizing NEPA in an original and 
rigorous way. She is the ultimate strict constructionist on NEPA, which 
succinctly states: “The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest 
extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations and public laws of the 
United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with 
the policies set forth in this Act . . . .”69 
Judge Fletcher, building on the tradition of her early circuit court 
predecessors on NEPA, developed a jurisprudence that has placed the 
focus on NEPA’s substantive provisions within the constraints 
established by the post-Warren Supreme Court. What she has done—as 
simple and logical as it sounds—is hold agencies accountable for their 
claims that they will not cause environmental harm. 
She opines there must be a sufficient and articulated basis for a 
mitigation measure to be effective, or the environmental study is not 
meeting its required procedural purpose of full disclosure to the public 
and informing decisionmakers before they act.70 She insists public 
officials answer the question: If you are not well-informed about 
whether environmental harm will occur, how can you have given the 
proposal a “hard look”? 
If “hard look” and “strict compliance” are required procedurally (even 
if a particular substantive result is not mandated, and the court cannot 
substitute its view for the executive agency’s on the course of action), 
then NEPA’s requirement to analyze environmental consequences and 
alternatives that avoid or otherwise mitigate those consequences—in 
short, “looking before we leap” and preserving options for future 
                                                     
NEPA Rules were developed and issued. As Chair of the Washington State’s Puget Sound Water 
Quality Authority in the 1980s (the predecessor agency to the state’s current Puget Sound 
Partnership), she used the SEPA, Washington State’s version of NEPA, in innovative fashion to 
produce a combined national estuary restoration plan and EIS. As noted earlier, and as a matter of 
full disclosure, the author is married to Ms. Fletcher, who is Judge Fletcher’s daughter. 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (2006). 
70. The Supreme Court has made clear the agency could still decide to cause the environmental 
harm, see Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989), but the agency’s 
impact analysis cannot hide behind sloppy mitigation claims. 
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generations (the gist of “sustainability”)—remains a compelling tool in a 
democracy with an independent judiciary. 
It is possible to give NEPA force while staying within the precedents 
of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Perhaps we should name it the “Fletcher Doctrine.” 
This approach is not unlike Judge Fletcher’s jurisprudence is other 
areas, whether immigration, death penalty, or human rights. It is 
practical, rather than ideological. As with other areas of the law where 
Judge Fletcher has made substantial contributions, her decisions 
demonstrate a profound consistency in protecting individuals and the 
environment from the heavy hand of government.71 
Judge Fletcher is a worthy successor to a worthy tradition.72 She has 
been reversed from time to time, but majority opinions respect the care 
she has given to her decisions and the courage of her principles. In this 
regard, she is in good company. We are reminded of Thurgood 
Marshall’s dissent in Strycker’s Bay, discussed above, where he 
concludes: 
The question whether HUD can make delay the paramount 
concern over environmental superiority is essentially a 
restatement of the question whether HUD in considering the 
environmental consequences of its proposed action gave those 
consequences a “hard look,” which is exactly the proper 
                                                     
71. This bears a certain resemblance to libertarian perspectives. This author believes the glib 
characterization of Judge Betty Fletcher as a liberal (a label she does wear with pride) is obviously 
superficial, as it was to her former client in private practice, Justice William O. Douglas. A more 
sophisticated assessment would look to the Western populist tradition, of which she has written and 
spoken, which has at its core respect for the individual and for nature, a philosophy that defies 
conventional liberal/conservative labels. 
72. Judge Fletcher continues a tradition of our nation’s great environmental jurists. Her former 
client, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, was one of the first judges both to look carefully 
at the agency record under NEPA, not simply to accept agency assertions, and to give substantive 
deference to CEQ. See Warm Springs Dam v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301 (1974). The full Supreme 
Court followed suit in the Marsh and Kleppe cases. See supra notes 49, 37. 
Judges Skelly Wright and Harold Leventhal on the D.C. Circuit provided similar NEPA 
jurisprudence. As Judge Wright noted in Calvert Cliffs: “[I]f the decision was reached procedurally 
without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factors—conducted fully and 
in good faith—it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse.” 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). In the mid-1970s, Judge Leventhal did not think examining the alternative of energy 
conservation when considering a new nuclear power plant was an “alleged oversight” on a 
“peripheral issue.” Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 685 F.2d 459 
(1982), rev’d, 462 U.S. 87 (1983). Nearly a decade into the twenty-first century, when climate 
change has finally been recognized as a serious matter, Judge Fletcher helped rectify the 
misdirection of Vermont Yankee by requiring a more rigorous analysis of alternatives for vehicle 
fuel efficiency standards in Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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question for the reviewing court to ask.73 
Like Justice Thurgood Marshall’s knowledge of housing in 
Washington, D.C.’s inner city, Judge Fletcher’s knowledge of the 
Columbia River—where her husband’s family homesteaded generations 
earlier—provides context for her opinion. That being said, it is not Judge 
Fletcher’s personal views or heritage that decide the case, but attention 
to the record itself. 
If we do not heal the earth with more deliberate speed, perhaps the 
concluding words of Judge Fletcher’s dissent in Northwest 
Environmental Advocates,74 like Justice Marshall’s in Stryker’s Bay, 
may inspire future courts: 
Fundamentally, the majority takes an ostrich’s head-in-the-sand 
approach to reviewing the agency’s analysis, settling for the 
Corps’ explanation without undertaking the required review of 
its decision making. It is true, we are not permitted to substitute 
our judgment for the reasoned decision of the agency. Neither, 
however, are we permitted to rubber-stamp the agency’s 
decision of what factors must be considered and what factors 
need not be considered without taking a detailed look at whether 
the agency’s reasoning is sound. Here, it is not. 
 The “hard look” here went awry. The Corps, as it must, 
acknowledged profound consequences from erosion if large 
quantities of sand are removed from the littoral system. Anyone 
familiar with the Washington coastline has seen the devastation 
from past erosion (consequences the Corps admits were caused 
by its own past bad practices). The Corps acknowledges that it 
has designated a deep-water disposal site to hold huge quantities 
of dredge spoils, but has no plan of mitigation if that site is used 
for its intended purpose. Nor does the Corps analyze when and 
how much erosion is likely to occur—only that it will be 
profound and devastating. Its analysis of increased toxicity that 
may result from dredging is completely inadequate, as is its 
analysis of possible changes in salinity. Last, but certainty not 
least, the economic analysis is highly suspect. 
 My bottom line is that the Corps has substantially more work to 
do. Hence my dissent.75 
                                                     
73. 444 U.S. 231, 231 (1980) (internal citation omitted). 
74. Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006). 
75. Id. at 1162 (Fletcher, J. dissenting). An interesting parallel to contemplate in this regard is the 
judicial evolution on climate change, now understood as a serious matter, from Judge Wald’s 
minority opinion in City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 912 
 
Weiner DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2010 2:23 PM 
2010] JUDGE FLETCHER AND NEPA 69 
 
Judge Fletcher is legendary for the high standard to which she holds 
herself and others. Some colleagues think it too high. The environmental 
degradation of the earth and of many human communities suggests 
otherwise. 
In the end, Judge Fletcher holds United States government officials 
accountable when making momentous decisions affecting people and 
nature—accountable to prepare and fully disclose the required studies, 
so the democratic process of civic and civil debate can occur; 
accountable to search for better alternatives; accountable to any 
promises they make that their actions will not harm environmental 
quality for present and future generations. 
This is the jurisprudence Judge Fletcher has bequeathed to the United 
States, and to those around the world who look to the United States and 
NEPA for leadership on environmental stewardship. 
                                                     
F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990), to Judge Fletcher’s majority opinion on fuel efficiency standards in 
Center for Biological Diversity, as discussed in William H. Rodgers Jr., NEPA’s Insatiable 
Optimism, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,618, 10,620 (2009). 
